Use /dev/random exclusively.

/dev/random will be used for uuid with fdisk.
/dev/random will be used for entropy when mounting swap with a random key.
If /dev/random does not open, the program will exit.
Programs will have to wait on /dev/random to supply entropy, which may be a
very long time unless you have a random number gathering daemon (hardware
random number generator).

Using multiple daemons is ideal:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/gkernel/
http://www.vanheusden.com/aed/
http://www.vanheusden.com/ved/

This patch goes on top of the loop-aes patch. This patch should only be used
if rngd is started before swapon during boot.

robert

diff -Naur util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/fdisk/fdisk.c util-linux-ng-2.14.1/fdisk/fdisk.c
--- util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/fdisk/fdisk.c	2008-09-10 09:02:43.000000000 +0000
+++ util-linux-ng-2.14.1/fdisk/fdisk.c	2009-02-09 03:49:54.000000000 +0000
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
 	ssize_t rv = -1;
 	struct timeval tv;
 
-	fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY);
 	if (fd >= 0) {
 	        rv = xread(fd, &v, sizeof v);
 		close(fd);
@@ -160,6 +160,10 @@
 	if (rv == sizeof v)
 		return v;
 
+	/* DIE!: This could only happen in a chroot. */
+	fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open /dev/random\n"));
+	exit(1);
+
 	/* Fallback: sucks, but better than nothing */
 	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
 	return (unsigned int)(tv.tv_sec + (tv.tv_usec << 12) + getpid());
diff -Naur util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/misc-utils/mcookie.c util-linux-ng-2.14.1/misc-utils/mcookie.c
--- util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/misc-utils/mcookie.c	2008-09-10 09:02:43.000000000 +0000
+++ util-linux-ng-2.14.1/misc-utils/mcookie.c	2009-02-09 03:37:32.000000000 +0000
@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@
    int minlength, maxlength;
 } rngs[] = {
    { "/dev/random",              16,  16 }, /* 16 bytes = 128 bits suffice */
-   { "/proc/interrupts",          0,   0 },
-   { "/proc/slabinfo",            0,   0 },
-   { "/proc/stat",                0,   0 },
-   { "/dev/urandom",             32,  64 },
 };
 #define RNGS (sizeof(rngs)/sizeof(struct rngs))
 
@@ -132,6 +128,8 @@
 	    break;
       } else if (Verbose)
 	 fprintf( stderr, _("Could not open %s\n"), rngs[i].path );
+	 /* DIE!: This could only happen in a chroot. */
+	 exit (1);
    }
 
    MD5Final( digest, &ctx );
diff -Naur util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/mount/lomount.c util-linux-ng-2.14.1/mount/lomount.c
--- util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/mount/lomount.c	2009-02-09 03:37:05.000000000 +0000
+++ util-linux-ng-2.14.1/mount/lomount.c	2009-02-09 03:37:19.000000000 +0000
@@ -750,9 +750,10 @@
 	 * SHA-512 of old fs data is used as workaround for missing
 	 * entropy in kernel's random number generator.
 	 */
-	if((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
-		fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open /dev/urandom\n"));
-		return 1;
+	if((fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open /dev/random\n"));
+		/* DIE!: This could only happen in a chroot. */
+		exit (1);
 	}
 	rd_wr_retry(fd, &b[64], 32, 0);
 
diff -Naur util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/mount/swapon.c util-linux-ng-2.14.1/mount/swapon.c
--- util-linux-ng-2.14.1.orig/mount/swapon.c	2009-02-09 03:37:05.000000000 +0000
+++ util-linux-ng-2.14.1/mount/swapon.c	2009-02-09 03:37:19.000000000 +0000
@@ -498,9 +498,10 @@
 	 * SHA-512 of old swap data is used as workaround for missing
 	 * entropy in kernel's random number generator.
 	 */
-	if(!(f = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"))) {
-		fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open /dev/urandom\n"));
-		goto errout0;
+	if(!(f = fopen("/dev/random", "r"))) {
+		fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open /dev/random\n"));
+		/* DIE!: This could only happen in a chroot */
+		exit (1);
 	}
 	fread(&b[64], 32, 1, f);
 
@@ -642,6 +643,13 @@
 					write(fd, &b[0], 32);
 					fsync(fd);
 				}
+				/*
+				 * DIE!: This could only happen in a chroot.
+				 * This is really not important, since this patched
+				 * version will not allow swapon to use this for
+				 * entropy. /dev/urandom can be used, needlessly.
+				*/
+				else { exit (1); }
 			}
 			close(fd);
 		}